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Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations
ELLEN YAROSHEFSKY*
Prosecutorial disclosure of information to the defense has long been recognized as
essential to a fair criminal justice system and yet, the required disclosure is ill defined
and the subject of ongoing contention. Prosecutor's obligations are informed by
various sources including state and federal constitutional provisions, statutes, court
rules and state ethics rules. The ABA Criminal Justice Standards, another source
defining that obligation, can and have served as guidance for judges, prosecutors and
defense lawyers, notably in areas of ambiguity. Those Standards were recently revised
to provide greater clarity as to the scope of what information should be provided to the
defense and the timing of the disclosure duty. This Article explores the changes made
by the revisions as well as areas-such as e-discovery-that were not included.
* Clinical Professor of Law and Director of the Jacob Burns Center for Ethics in the Practice of
Law. Bruce Green, Chair of the ABA Criminal Justice Section, should be applauded for his leadership
in envisioning the roundtables around the country. I thank Rory Little and the staff of the Hastings
Law Journal and the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for their work in organizing the Hastings
symposium, entitled "Navigating Prosecutorial Ethics: A Roundtable Discussion of the ABA
Standards for Criminal Litigation," and this publication. I am grateful to the jurists, prosecutors,
defense lawyers, and academics who participated in these roundtables for their thoughtful and
invaluable insights. Thanks to Jenny May for her work on the discussion paper and this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
Little is more essential to a fair criminal justice system than
prosecutorial disclosure of information to the defense. Disclosure laws,
rules, and policies should "contribute[] to the fair and efficient
administration of criminal justice by ... minimizing the undesirable
effect of surprise at the tral... and..., contributing to an accurate
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence."' The subject of
seemingly perpetual discussion, debate, scholarly articles, and
conferences, prosecutorial disclosure obligations increasingly have
become the focus in high publicity cases. Failure to disclose significant
evidence to the defense in numerous cases has resulted in reversal,
dismissal, and years of incarceration for the wrongfully convicted.' Many
i. FED. R. CiUM. P. (1974) advisory committee note ("The amendment making disclosure
mandatory under the circumstances prescribed in subdivision (a)(i)(A) resolves such ambiguity as
may currently exist, in the direction of more liberal discovery. This is done in the view that broad
discovery contributes to the fair and efficient administration of criminal justice by providing the
defendant with enough information to make an informed decision as to plea; by minimizing the
undesirable effect of surprise at the trial; and by otherwise contributing to an accurate determination
of the issue of guilt or innocence." (citations omitted)).
2. See Elen Yaroshefsky, Foreword: New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure
Obligations: What Really Works?, 31 CARDozo L. Ry. 1943, 1943 n.i (2010) (citing United States v.
Zhenli Ye Gon, 287 F. App'x 113 (D.C. CC. 208); United States v. Grace, 526 F33d 499 (9th Cir.
[Vol. 62:1321I1322
PROSECUTORIAL DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS
ask why our legal system provides plenary disclosure policies in
procedures in civil cases, where only money is at stake, but provides
significantly limited disclosure in criminal cases, where liberty is at stake.
The answer is informed by the various sources that dictate the
prosecution's disclosure obligation to the defense. These include federal
and state constitutional provisions, as interpreted by courts, federal and
state statutes, court rules and orders, and state ethics rules.'
Another source that guides prosecutorial disclosure decisions is the
ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function.! These
nonbinding Standards have been cited by the Supreme Court in
numerous cases.6 As the Court has recognized, "the obligation to disclose
evidence favorable to the defense may arise more broadly under a
2oo8); United States v. Shaygan, 661 F. Supp. 2d 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2009); Unites States v. Jones, 620 F.
Supp. 2d 163 (D. Mass. 2009); United States v. Stevens, No. o8-23i(EGS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
125267 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009)); Government Misconduct, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Government-Misconduct.php (last visited May 23, 20II)
("Common forms of misconduct by prosecutors include... [w]ithholding exculpatory evidence from
defense....").
3. See, e.g., John J. Capowski, Establishing Separate Civil and Criminal Evidence Codes, 61 ARK.
L. REv. 217, 237-38 (2oo8) ("While discovery is limited in criminal cases, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provide for a wide range of discovery devices, including depositions, interrogatories,
and requests for the production of documents. This gap between civil and criminal discovery became
greater with the adoption of the disclosure provisions of Rule 26[,] ... especially with the requirement
of pretrial objections set out in Rule 26(a)(3). The civil trial process is becoming more predictable and
choreographed while the criminal trial remains a proceeding where 'witness unreliability, surprise, and
discretion' continue to be hallmarks. Recognition of these widening differences through separate
evidentiary rules seems appropriate." (footnotes omitted)).
4. See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof'I Responsibility, Formal Op. 09-454 (2009), available
at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecollar/ProsecutorialMisconduct/$FILE/09-454.pdf [hereinafter
ABA Op. 09-454] (explaining the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence and information favorable to
the defense).
5. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FuNCrIoN (3d ed. 1993). This Article began as
a background paper for roundtable discussions at law schools around the country. My initial
presentation of the issues paper was at U.C. Hastings College of Law during the symposium, entitled
"Navigating Prosecutorial Ethics: A Roundtable Discussion on the ABA's Standards for Criminal
Litigation," which took place on October 15, 2olo. I also presented the paper at roundtable discussions
at American University, Washington College of Law (Nov. 5, 2010); Washington and Lee School of
Law (Nov. 19, 201o); Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University (Oct. 21, 20o0); and
Case Western Reserve University School of Law (Oct. 29, 20o). Distinguished jurists, academics,
state and federal prosecutors and defense lawyers engaged in thoughtful dialogue, often sharply
disagreeing about the issues and questions raised. This Article incorporates many of the comments
and suggestions made at various roundtable discussions. The text of the proposed Prosecution
Function Standards are printed in this issue as an appendix to Rory K. Little, Introduction: The ABA's
Project to Revise the Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution and Defense Functions,
62 HASTINGS L.J. IiiI, app. (2011).
6. Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1783 n.15 (2009) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3.8(d) (2oo8); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION (3d ed. 1993)); see also, e.g.,
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 n.6 (2005) (citing STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE
FUNCTION § 4-4.1 ( 3 d ed.1993)); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (995) (citing STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.1n(a) (3d ed. 1993)).
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prosecutor's ethical or statutory obligations" than under the federal
constitution.
The ABA first introduced the Standards in 1964 and since then has
reviewed and modernized them. The ABA is again considering proposed
revisions to the Standards, including the proposed Standard 3-5.5, which
discusses disclosure to the defense.8
This Article explores the extent to which the proposed revisions to
the Standards on disclosure are adequate for and necessary to the fair
administration of justice. These revisions clarify the prosecution's
disclosure duties and address some of the key issues that are still debated
amongst scholars, practitioners, and judges. Part I provides an overview
of the prosecution's disclosure duties. Part II reviews the significant
changes contained in proposed Standard 3-5.5, which concerns
prosecutorial disclosure obligations. Part III examines issues not
addressed by the proposed Standard, including e-discovery and judicial
supervision of discovery. I conclude that this proposed Standard makes
significant improvements to the current Standard; however, the
Standards should address other key issues.
I. PROSECUTORIAL DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS
Prosecutors' disclosure obligations derive from a variety of sources
including state and federal constitutions, statutes, court rules, case law,
and ethics rules and standards. The duty to disclose varies by jurisdiction.
It varies both between and amongst federal and state jurisdictions, and
even within state and local offices. As a result, the scope of the
prosecutor's federal and state disclosure obligations is often unclear.
A. FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS
In 1963, the Supreme Court held in Brady v. Maryland that the
"suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution."' Brady and its progeny extended the prosecution's duty
to disclose evidence that impeaches the credibility of the government's
witness, whether or not the defense requests it."o The prosecution has a
7. Cone, 129 S. Ct. at 1783 n.15.
8. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5 (Proposed Revisions
200).
9. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (emphasis added). For a comprehensive discussion of the evolution of
the Brady doctrine, see Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV.
685 (2oo6).
1o. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97,
112-13 (1976); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972); Harm v. State, 183 S.W.3 d 4o3, 4o6
(Tex. Crim. App. 2oo6).
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duty to make reasonable efforts to insure that its agents make favorable
evidence available to the defense."
United States v. Bagley established that undisclosed evidence is
"material" and will result in reversal only if there is a "reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been different."" This materiality
standard is the source of significant and ongoing controversy, because in
many jurisdictions, this standard for reversal on appeal is also utilized as
the standard for defining the duty to provide pretrial disclosure of
information. 3
Application of the Brady doctrine varies widely across federal and
state jurisdictions, and there remains a lack of clarity about the
boundaries of its requirements. 4 Scholars decry disclosure practices and
the "dissonance between Brady's grand expectation to civilize the United
States criminal justice and the grim reality of its largely unfulfilled
promise.""
Federal and state court rules and statutes supplement prosecutors'
constitutional obligations. For example, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16 compels prosecutors to produce "[u]pon a defendant's
request" information "material to preparing the defense." 6 The Jencks
Act requires, inter alia, prosecutors to produce prior statements of a
government witness after that witness testifies. 7 State court rules and
statutes also impose disclosure obligations.'8 These varying rules call for
disclosure of specified documents, physical items, and other information. '
II. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437.
12. 473 U.S. at 682.
13. See discussion infra Part II.B.
14. See LAURAL HOOPER & SHELIA THORPE, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., BRADY V. MARYLAND MATERIALS IN
THE UNITED STATES DisTnICT CouRTS: RULES, ORDERS, AND POLICIES 7-8 (2oo7).
15. Gershman, supra note 9, at 726; Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional
Mirages: The Task of Brady v. Maryland, 33 McGEORGE L. REV. 643, 658 (2002) ("Brady's doctrinal
limitations as a pre-trial discovery mechanism are magnified by the realities of criminal practice.").
16. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6. Chief among the disclosure requirements imposed is disclosure of the
defendant's statement, his prior criminal record, tangible objects, reports of examinations and tests,
and the substance of the testimony to be provided by expert witnesses. See id. Rule 16 imposes
narrower obligations than the Constitution, because it does not apply to information "material to
punishment." See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,461-64 (1996).
17. Jencks Act, i8 U.S.C. § 35oo(b) (2oo6).
18. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(b) (providing a list of items a prosecutor must disclose); MASS.
R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(i)(A) (providing a list of mandatory discovery for the defendant); N.J. RULES OF Cr.
R. 3:13-3 (requiring that statements by all persons known to possess relevant information must be
provided within fourteen days of an indictment). See generally JOHN SCHOEFFEL, LEGAL AID Soc'y,
CRIMINAL DISCOVERY REFORM IN NEW YORK: A PROPOSAL TO REPEAL C.P.L. ARTICLE 240 AND To ENACT
A NEW C.P.L. ARTICLE 245 (2oo9) (discussing a 1991 survey of discovery practices in large states with
big cities).
19. See Symposium, New Perspectives on Brady and Other Disclosure Obligations: Report of the
Working Groups on Best Practices, 31 CARDOzo L. REV. 1961, 1963 (2010) [hereinafter New
Perspectives on Brady].
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These may include: written and recorded statements of the defendant,
reports of the defendant's prior criminal convictions, physical evidence
that the prosecution plans to use at trial, expert reports, witnesses'
criminal records, and prosecution witnesses' relevant written and
recorded statements.o Unlike in the federal system, where prosecutors
need not list their witnesses prior to trial, prompt and full disclosure of
witness statements is the rule in many states.' Many states specify time
limits within which disclosures must be produced."
B. ETrcs RULES AND STANDARDS
State ethics rules impose obligations upon all lawyers in state and
federal court beyond those required by state constitutions, statutes, and
court rules.23 Most state courts have adopted a rule based on ABA Model
Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8(d), which requires the prosecution to
make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to
the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information
known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved of this
responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.24
State ethics rules based on Model Rule 3.8(d) potentially impose
obligations beyond the federal constitutional requirements. The U.S.
Supreme Court, citing Model Rule 3.8(d) and Prosecution Function
Standard 3-3.n1(a), acknowledged that a prosecutor's disclosure duty
"may arise more broadly under a prosecutor's ethical or statutory
obligations.""
In 2009, the ABA's ethics committee interpreted Model Rule 3.8(d)
in Formal Opinion o9-454. The ABA concluded that the prosecutor's
ethical obligation under Model Rule 3.8(d) is separate from, and in many
respects more expansive than, disclosure obligations under the
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. SCHOEFFEL, supra note i8, at 148-50.
23. Federal government lawyers are bound by state ethics rules. See 28 C.F.R. § 77.3 (2010)
("[Aittorneys for the government shall conform their conduct and activities to the state rules and laws,
and federal local courts rules, governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that
attorney's duties .... ).
24. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (20o). All states, except California, adopted a
Code of Professional Conduct modeled on the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct: State Adoption of Model Rules, CrR. FOR PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professionalresponsibility/publications/model-rules-of-professional-
conduct.html (last visited May 23, 201I).
25. Cone v. BeUl, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1783 n.15 (2oo9) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
3 .8(d) (2oo8); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.ri(a) (3 d ed. 1993)); see
also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,437 (995).
26. See ABA Op. 09-454, supra note 4.
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Constitution. 7 The opinion took the view that Model Rule 3.8(d)
requires disclosure of evidence or information favorable to the defense
without regard to the potential impact of the evidence upon the verdict
(materiality), and that disclosure must be made early enough so that the
defense counsel may use the evidence and information effectively." In
the ABA's view, the rule requires disclosure of evidence and information
prior to a guilty plea proceeding." In cases where the prosecution
believes that early disclosure or disclosure of evidence or information
may compromise an ongoing investigation or a prosecution witness's
safety, the opinion advises the prosecutor to seek a protective order.o
Prior to the ABA's opinion, some courts that discussed Model Rule
3.8(d) "incorrectly assume[ed that] it merely mirrored the Brady
obligation."" It remains to be seen to what extent courts will react to the
opinion.
C. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
The ABA Criminal Justice Standards set forth the prosecution's
disclosure duty.3' The current Standard 3-3.11, "Disclosure of Evidence
by the Prosecutor," provides:
(a) A prosecutor should not intentionally fail to make timely
disclosure to the defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of the
existence of all evidence or information which tends to negate the guilt
of the accused or mitigate the offense charged or which would tend to
reduce the punishment of the accused.
(b) A prosecutor should not fail to make a reasonably diligent effort
to comply with a legally proper discovery request.
(c) A prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence
because he or she believes it will damage the prosecution's case or aid
the accused.3 3
The proposed Standard 3-5.5, to replace Standard 3-3.11, contains
greater specificity and addresses a range of issues not contained in the
current provision. It provides:
27. Id. at 3-4.
28. Id. at 2,6.
29. Id. at 6.
30. Id.
31. Theresa A. Newman & James E. Coleman, Jr., The Prosecutor's Duty of Disclosure Under
ABA Model Rule 3.8(d), CHAMPION, Mar. 20Io, at 20, 2o. But see Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1783
n-15 (2oo9) ("[T]he rule in Bagley (and, hence, in Brady) requires less of the prosecution than the
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Prosecution Function and Defense Function 3-3.1i(a) (3 d ed.
1993)...." (alteration in original) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 3.8(d) (200).
32. The ABA House of Delegates approved the Prosecution Function Standards in February of
1992. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION, at iii (3d ed. 1993).
33. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.11 (3d ed. 1993).
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(a) A prosecutor should promptly seek to identify all information in
the possession of the prosecution or its agents that tends to negate the
guilt of the accused, mitigate the offense charged, impeach the
government's witnesses or evidence, or reduce the likely punishment of
the accused if convicted.
(b) The prosecutor should also promptly advise other governmental
agencies involved in the case of their continuing duty to identify,
preserve, and disclose to the prosecutor information described in (a)
above.
(c) Before trial of a criminal case, a prosecutor should make timely
disclosure to the defense of information described in (a) above that is
known to the prosecutor, regardless of whether the prosecutor believes
it is likely to change the result of the proceeding. Regarding discovery
prior to a guilty plea, see Standard 3-5.8 below. The obligations to
identify and disclose such information continue throughout the
prosecution of a criminal case.
(d) A prosecutor should promptly respond to, and make a diligent
effort to comply with, legally proper discovery requests. The prosecutor
should ordinarily provide specific responses to individualized defense
requests for specific information, not just an acknowledgement of the
prosecutor's general discovery obligations.
(e) The prosecutor should also make prompt efforts to identify and
disclose to the defense any [relevant?] physical evidence that has been
gathered in the investigation, and provide the defense a reasonable
opportunity to examine it.
(f) A prosecutor should not avoid pursuit of information or evidence
because the prosecutor believes it will damage the prosecution's case
or aid the accused. A prosecutor should not intentionally attempt to
obscure information identified pursuant to (a) above by disclosing it as
part of a large volume of materials.
(g) A prosecutor should determine whether additional statutes, rules
or caselaw may govern or restrict the disclosure of information, and
comply with them absent court order.'
It addresses three significant issues that cause the greatest degree of
controversy and disparity in practices across the country. These are:
(i) the scope of the disclosure obligation, (2) "materiality," and (3) the
timing of disclosure. Each of these issues is addressed below.
II. THE KEY ISSUES
A. SCOPE OF DISCLOSURE
The varied sources defining a prosecutor's disclosure obligations
result in confusion and differing interpretations of similar terminology,
rather than uniformity as to the standard for the scope of disclosure.
Some jurisdictions impose a legal obligation to provide "exculpatory and
34. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION§ 3-5.5 (Proposed Revisions 2olo)
(emphasis omitted).
1328 [Vol. 62:I321
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impeachment evidence," while others impose an obligation to provide
"favorable" evidence or favorable "information."5 At least fifteen states
require the prosecution to disclose "favorable" evidence or information
regardless of whether the defense has filed a request or motion.36 Most Of
these states define "favorable" as some version of evidence that "tends
to negate guilt,"-a standard echoed in the rules of professional conduct
for prosecutors." Some cases in federal and state jurisdictions have
determined that favorable information includes, but is not limited to,
promises of immunity, prior criminal records, prior inconsistent
statements of government witnesses, information about mental or
physical impairment of government witnesses, inconsistent or
contradictory scientific tests, pending charges against witnesses,
monetary inducements, bias, proffers of witnesses and documents
relating to the negotiation process with the government, and the
government's failure to institute civil proceedings against key witnesses.
35. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977) (describing the duty to provide "evidence
favorable to the accused"); United States v. De Angelis, 490 F.2d 1004, 1010 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding
that failing to produce a witness does not violate due process where defendant does not prove the
witness's testimony "would have been useful to" her); People v. Jenkins, 360 N.E.2d 1288, 1290 (N.Y.
1977) (holding that in order to compel production of informant, defendant must demonstrate that
proposed testimony would be "exculpatory"), abrogated by People v. Scarborough, 402 N.E.2d 1127,
1132 nl.2 (N.Y. 198o). But see United States v. Acosta, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1246-47 (D. Nev. 2005)
(upholding a magistrate judge's ruling requiring prosecutors to disclose to the defense before trial all
evidence that "negates] guilt of the accused or mitigate[s] the offense," rather than just favorable
evidence that is material); People v. Vigil, 729 P.2d 360, 368 (Colo. 1986) (dismissing charges for a
prosecutor's failure to disclose an informer's identity where producing the informant "would have
been relevant and helpful to [defendant's] defense").
36. A 2oo4 report of the Judicial Conference of the United States offers a detailed survey of the
then-existing differing policies. LAURAL L. HOOPER ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CR., TREATMENT OF BRADY V.
MARYLAND MATERIAL IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT AND STATE COURTs' RULES, ORDERS AND POLICIES 22
(2004). Subsequently, Ohio and North Carolina amended their discovery rules. See OHIo RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (201o); N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (200).
37. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, and Washington have adopted a version of Model
Rule 3.8 and borrow the "tends to negate guilt" language. ALASKA RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8
(20IO); A.R.S. Sup. Cr. RULES R. 42 (2005); ARIz. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT ER 3.8 (2010); COLO.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2010); FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-3.8 (2oo9); HAw. RULES
OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(b) (200); ME. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3 -7 (i)(2) (2010); MD.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 16-812 (2010); MAsS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3 .8(d) (2010); N.H.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3 .8(d) (20o); N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2010); OHIO
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3 .8(d) (2010); WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2010);
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (20oo). New Mexico also uses the same language. N.M.
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 16-308 (200). California, however, phrases its duty as disclosing "any
exculpatory evidence." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.i(e) (West 2010).
38. See Moore v. Illinois, 4o8 U.S. 786, 795-96 (1972) (prosecution's failure to hand over notes
from a witness interview); United States v. Udechukwu, ii F.3 d n1o, io6 (ist Cir. 1993)(prosecutor's independent corroboration of truthfulness of defendant's story); Ballinger v. Kerby,
3 F.3d 1371, 1376 (ioth Cir. 1993) (photograph impeaching key prosecution witness); United States v.
Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993) (informant's prior criminal record); United States v.
Brumel-Alvarez, 991 F.2d 1452, 1463 (9th Cir. 1992) (government memorandum highly critical of
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As mentioned above, some jurisdictions impose a legal obligation to
provide "exculpatory and impeachment evidence" while others require
disclosure of "favorable" evidence or "favorable information.""
However, a prosecutor may sometimes view certain information as not
discoverable because it does not "impeach," while the defense attorney,
with a different view of the case, may believe that the evidence is
"favorable" and therefore subject to disclosure. The Standards should
seek to diminish this inevitable "cognitive bias."4 o It is advisable to craft a
Standard that diminishes prosecutorial subjectivity in evaluating the
impact of information upon the defense. Consequently, a Standard that
broadens the disclosure obligation and is specific reduces the likelihood
of discovery disputes, misunderstandings between adversaries, and
failures to disclose information that may lead to wrongful convictions.
Broader discovery standards and practices reduce the tendency toward
"game playing" and encourage a fair process.
Some district attorneys across the country have enacted "open file"
policies, which require significantly broader disclosure than any of the
rules or laws currently in place.' While the definition varies, the goal of
an expansive open-file policy is to disclose all of the nonprivileged
information and evidence gathered in a case to the defense as early as
possible (prior to statutory time periods).42 Rather than determine whether
informant's credibility); United States v. Spagnoulo, 96o F.2d 990, 993-95 (1ith Cir. 1992) (psychiatric
report); Untied States v. Martinez-Mercado, 888 F.2d 1484, 1487-88 (5 th Cir. 1989) (investigative
reports); United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1197 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (statements made in
proffer session leading to cooperation agreement); Alvarado v. Superior Court, 5 P-3 d 203, 205 (Cal.
2000) (identity of key prosecution witness). But see Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. t, 8 (1995) (per
curiam) (polygraph result favorable to defendant not Brady evidence); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,
221 (1982) (juror's bias was not Brady evidence).
39. State v. Anderson, 56 So. 3d 236, 237 (La. 2011) ("To the extent that 'a showing that the
prosecution knew of an item of favorable evidence unknown to the defense does not amount to a
Brady violation, without more,' a prosecutor is accorded 'a degree of discretion,' in making the
determination during the pre-trial stages of a case, in which 'the character of a piece of evidence as
favorable will often turn on the context of the existing of potential evidentiary record."' (citations
omitted) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 49, 437, 439 (1995))). Often the terms "favorable" and
"exculpatory or impeachment" achieve the same result.
40. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 1950 (describing Dr. Maria Hartwig's conclusions on
cognitive bias and confirmation bias in evaluating exculpatory evidence); Symposium, Voices from the
Field: An Inter-Professional Approach to Managing Critical Information, 31 CARDOzo L. REV. 2037,
2o61-69 (2010) [hereinafter Voices from the Field] (presentation by Dr. Maria Hartwig, Assistant
Professor, John Jay Coll. of Criminal Justice) (discussing confirmation bias in lie detection and its
effect on disclosure). See generally Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some
Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2oo6) (examining cognitive biases that can
affect prosecutorial decisionmaking and proposing reforms to mitigate such biases).
41. See, e.g., Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 1951 (describing remarks made by John Chisholm,
Dist. Attorney, Milwaukee Cnty.); Voices from the Field, supra note 40, at 2071-72 (presentation of
Terri Moore, First Assistant, Dallas Cnty. Dist. Attorney).
42. See Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 1951 (describing remarks of John Chisholm, Dist. Attorney,
Milwaukee Cnty.).
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the information is material or favorable to the defense's case,
prosecutors who operate under open-file policies gather and turn over all
of the nonprivileged information to the defense.43 There are notable
exceptions to disclosure in such jurisdictions, including information
which could place witnesses and informants in danger as well as other
information that may create privacy issues.'
North Carolina was the first state to enact legislation for full open-
file discovery, requiring automatic disclosure of all nonprivileged
information in the prosecution's entire file.45 Recently, Ohio followed
suit.46 Colorado, Florida, Arizona, North Carolina, and New Jersey all
have broad discovery laws and rules, often based upon the ABA
Criminal Justice Standards for Discovery and Trial by Jury.47 Similarly,
local offices throughout the country-such as in Milwaukee, Wisconsin
and Portland, Oregon-have full open-file discovery.#' Other cities and
localities have more limited "open-file" discovery programs.49
Proposed Standard 3-5.5 moves beyond these differences in various
jurisdictions, and broadens and clarifies the scope of the prosecution's
disclosure duties. The Standard requires the prosecution to "promptly
seek to identify all information in the possession of the prosecution or its
agents that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the offense
charged, impeach the government's witnesses or evidence, or reduce the
likely punishment of the accused if convicted.""o
First, this revision clarifies that the required disclosure extends to
information, not only that which is evidence or potential evidence. Some
federal and state court courts hold that information need not be
produced unless the information in question would itself be admissible at
trial." This, of course, places the prosecutor in the tenuous position of
43. See id.
44. See id.; see also Voices from the Field, supra note 4o, at 2077 (presentation of John Chisholm,
Dist. Attorney, Milwaukee Cnty.).
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903 (20oo). North Carolina moved to an open-file system in 2004. S.L.
2004-154, S.B. No. 52 (N.C. 2004).
46. See OHIO R. or CRIM. PRoc. 16 (2010).
47. See JUSTICE PRoIECr, EXPANDED DISCOVERY IN CRIMINAL CASES: A PoLIcY REVIEW 15-17
(2oo7); see also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DISCOVERY AND TRIAL BY JURY (3d ed. 1996).
48. See, e.g., Voices from the Field, supra note 4o, at 2074-75 (presentation of John Chisholm,
District Attorney, Milwaukee Cnty.); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 135.815 (2oo).
49. See, e.g., Voices from the Field, supra note 40, at 2071 (presentation of Terri Moore, First
Assistant, Dallas Cnty. Dist. Attorney) (describing the system in Dallas County, Texas).
50. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5(a) (Proposed Revisions
2010) (emphasis added). The current Standard, in relevant part, required the prosecution to timely
notify the defense of the existence of "all evidence or information which tends to negate the guilt of
the accused or mitigate the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the punishment of the
accused." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.1i(a) (3 d ed. 1993).
51. In Wood v. Bartholomew, the Supreme Court suggested that admissibility is a precondition to
trigger a prosecution's Brady disclosure duties. 516 U.S. I, 6 (1995) (per curiam) (reasoning that
because polygraph results that would have impeached a government witness were not admissible, they
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assessing the likely admissibility of information. In contrast, other courts
have concluded that disclosure is not premised upon admissibility.
Rather, the standard is that the information leads to admissible
evidence.s2 Some courts hold that the information need only be useful to
the defense in building its case in order to be discoverable.53 The U.S.
Department of Justice Attorneys' Manual ("USAM") requires disclosure
of exculpatory and impeachment information "regardless of whether the
information subject to disclosure would itself constitute admissible
evidence."54 The proposed Standard, like its predecessor and Model Rule
3.8(d), adopts this broader view."
Second, the proposed Standard avoids use of the term "favorable"
as a qualifier of the information required to be produced. Instead, it
specifies the required categories for disclosure of information. It requires
prosecutors to produce information that "tends to negate the
guilt[,] ... mitigate the offense[,] ... impeach the government's witnesses
or evidence, or reduce the likely punishment." 6 Arguably, this diminishes
subjective judgment by prosecutors, but it still places the prosecution in a
position where it may not know whether information actually
"impeaches" a government witness. The prosecution is not likely to
did not constitute Brady evidence). For examples of cases holding that admissibility determines
disclosure, see Madsen v. Dormire, 137 F.3d 602, 604 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Derr, 99o F.2d
1330, 1335-36 (D.C. Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d io6
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc); United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 249 (6th Cir. 1991); Zeigler v.
Callahan, 659 F.2d 254, 269 (ist Cir. 1981); United States v. Atkinson, 429 F. Supp. 88o, 884 (E.D.N.C.
1977); Thornton v. State, 231 S.E.2d 729,733 (Ga. 1977)-
52. E.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 496 F.3d 221, 226 n.4 (2d Cir. 2007) ("The objectives of
fairness ... require that the prosecution made the defense aware of material information potentially
leading to admissible evidence favorable to the defense."); Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 F.3d 1, 5 (ist Cir.
2003) (holding that hearsay statement of victim may have led to the discovery of witnesses to
corroborate information contained in the statement); Paradis v. Arave, 24o F.3d 1169, 1178-79 (9 th
Cir. 2001) (holding that the prosecutor's notes were not admissible but could have been used to
contradict a key medical witness); Williamson v. Moore, 221 F.3d II77, 1183 (iith Cir. 2000) (holding
that non-verbatim, non-adopted witness statements are not admissible as impeachment evidence and
could not have led the defense to impeachment or exculpatory evidence); Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3 d
695, 703 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that inadmissible hearsay may be material if it "would have led to
admissible evidence"); United States v. Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1200 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("[Brady
includes all] evidence that may reasonably be considered favorable to the defendant's case and that
would likely lead to admissible evidence .... ).
53. Jones v. Jago, 575 F.2d 1164, 1169 (6th Cir. 1978) ("[Tlhe threshold of materiality is relatively
low where a specific request is involved."); Sudikoff, 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1200 ("[T]he government is
obligated to disclose all evidence relating to guilt or punishment which might reasonably be considered
favorable to the defendant's case."); Smith v. United States, 375 F. Supp. 1244, 1248 (E.D. Va. 1974)
("[I]t may be sufficient that the undisclosed information, thought not admissible into evidence, would
have been somehow useful to the defense in structuring its case.").
54. DEP'T OF JUSCE, UNITED STATES ArORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-5.0oo(C)(3) (2oo9) [hereinafter U.S.
ArrORNEYS' MANUAL].
55. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5(a) (Proposed Revisions
2010).
56. Id.
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know the theory of the defense and how information might be used to
impeach." An approach that may diminish this problem is to require the
prosecution to provide information that adversely impacts the credibility
of the witness or evidence.
It is noteworthy that both prosecutors and defense attorneys
maintain that the need for greater specificity of the scope of disclosure.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) contended that the failure to define
"impeaching" requires "practitioners to contend with multiple
interpretations and lead[s] to virtually unlimited disclosure obligations
on the government to turn over innuendo, hearsay, and rumor, no matter
how remote or speculative."" The American College of Trial Lawyers
("ACTL") and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
("NACDL") proposed specific items for disclosure as a change to the
vague nature of the term "favorable information."'" Various proposals to
modify Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure ii and 16 that provide,
inter alia, for greater specificity have been, and remain, under
consideration for at least the last nine years.6 Such proposals to define
the legal obligation with specificity are properly before the courts and
legislatures. By contrast, the ABA Criminal Justice Standards provide
guidance and a framework within which to consider specific items for
disclosure. It is unrealistic and perhaps unwise to expect that the
Standards should contain such specificity.
Third, the proposed Standard imposes a disclosure obligation only if
the information is in possession of the prosecutor or its agents.62 Some
federal prosecutors argue that this Standard is too broad and imposes a
duty upon the prosecutor to seek out information from a wide range of
agencies that are not involved in the case." One key example noted by
57. Similarly, the prosecutor should not be placed in the position of having to determine whether
information tends to "reduce" the likelihood of punishment. It is the defense lawyer who is best
positioned to make that determination. Consequently, the Standard ought to be broadened, perhaps to
a Standard establishing the duty to produce information that "affects punishment."
58. ROBERT W. TARUN ET AL., AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF
DISCLOSURE OF FAVORABLE INFORMATION UNDER FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURES II AND 16,
at 17 (2003).
59. Letter from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Honorable David F. Levi, Chair,
Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 6 (June 5, 2007), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Rule%2016%2oPart%20.pdf (discussing proposals to amend Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 16).
60. Cynthia Hujar Orr, The State of NACDL, CHAMPION, July 201o, at 5, 6 ("NACDL has also
pushed for measures in DOJ, Congress, and local legislatures to require prosecutors to provide
favorable evidence to the defense."); see also TARUN ET AL., supra note 58, at so-Is.
61. See, e.g., TARUN ET AL., supra note 58, at 17-27.
62. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5(a) (Proposed Revisions
2010).
63. The roundtable discussions around the country involved a wide range of participants from
varying jurisdictions, including state and federal prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, and academics.
The views noted herein are of individuals and do not represent official or unofficial policies or
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federal prosecutors is a case that involves international terrorism, where
many agencies may possess "information" that would impeach a
government witness or reduce the likely punishment of the accused.
Some federal prosecutors argue that this imposes an undue burden and is
a "standard-less standard." Its language is cited as an example of the
need to adhere solely to law and to DOJ internal disclosure policies and
practices. Federal prosecutors note that the precept of the USAM, and
the practices of governing local federal districts, is, "when in doubt,
disclose the information."6" Recent discovery initiatives by the DOJ
comport with the language of the proposed Standard. The Ogden
Memorandum specifically addresses the need for federal prosecutors to
seek out such information from a wide range of agencies and other
sources of information.' As electronic data systems are enhanced, the
obligation to seek out and produce such information should be met more
readily."
Finally, legitimate considerations weigh against liberal disclosure in
certain types of cases, notably, those raising concerns about witness
protection, confidential information, and national security. While these
issues may arise in a minority of cases, the Standards should
acknowledge and provide for appropriate methods to address limits on
disclosure. This may include excision of identifying information of
witnesses, or, in unique circumstances, production of information for the
attorney's eyes only.Y Ex parte submissions to the court to seek
limitations on disclosure should be permitted in the proposed Standards.
Such exceptions to disclosure exist in jurisdictions with open-file
discovery and could provide model language.6
B. MATERIALITY
Perhaps the most significant source of ongoing debate about
disclosure obligations stems from whether "materiality" of the
practices or any state or federal office.
64. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Dep't Prosecutors,
Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery (Jan. 4, 201o), available at
http://www.justice.gov/dag/discovery-guidance.html.
65. Id.
66. ABA Formal Opinion 09-454 and Model Rule 3.8(d) impose a different obligation and
require production of requisite information only if "known to the prosecutor[s]" or their agents. See
ABA Op. 09-454, supra note 4, at i (citing ABA MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUcr R. 3.8(d) (2oo9)).
This makes plain that the prosecution, unless so required by law, is not mandated to investigate
whether such agencies have this information. Id. at 5-6.
67. Prohibition on the defense counsel sharing information with her client raises obvious
constitutional concerns about the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and presentation of a defense.
These issues have been given full consideration elsewhere. See In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S.
Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 93, 115-30 (2d Cir. 2008); U.S. v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 280-9 (4th
Cir. 200).
68. See supra note 45-49 and accompanying text.
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information should be the standard for evaluating pretrial disclosure
obligations. The constitutional limitation of "materiality" -"whether in
[the evidence's] absence [the defendant] received a fair trial"-is the
appellate standard that governs reversal of a conviction for failure to
disclose information.6
A substantial question exists as to whether that standard applies to
pretrial disclosure decisions-that is, whether prosecutors may withhold
evidence that they do not regard as "material." A few federal courts have
held that the "materiality" standard is solely an appellate one that does
not apply to pretrial disclosure."o Many federal courts define the pretrial
Brady obligation by reference to materiality:
Although the government's obligations under Brady may be thought
of as a constitutional duty arising before or during the trial of a
defendant, the scope of the government's constitutional duty-and,
concomitantly, the scope of a defendant's constitutional right-is
ultimately defined retrospectively, by reference to the likely effect that
the suppression of particular evidence had on the outcome of the trial."
To make matters more complex, prosecutors and defense lawyers rarely
agree as to what constitutes "materiality," and appellate courts produce
split opinions." Consequently, in some offices, the prosecution may
choose not to disclose information because of the prosecutor's judgment
that it lacks significance or is not relevant. In some instances, the
69. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,434 (1995). Materiality is considered in terms of the suppressed
evidence collectively, not item by item. Id. at 436-37.
70. See United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2005) ("[Tjhe government must
always produce any potentially exculpatory or otherwise favorable evidence without regard to how the
withholding of such evidence might be viewed-with the benefit of hindsight-as affecting the
outcome of the trial."); United States v. Acosta, 357 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233 (D. Nev. 2005) ("Simply
because 'material' failures to disclose exculpatory evidence violate due process does not mean only
'material' disclosures are required."); United States v. Carter, 313 F. Supp. 2d 921, 925 (E.D. Wis.
2004) ("[I1n the pretrial context, the court should require disclosure of favorable evidence under
Brady and Giglio without attempting to analyze its 'materiality' at trial."); United States v. Sudikoff,
36 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("Because the definitions of materiality as applied to
appellate review are not appropriate in the pretrial discovery context, the Court relies on the plain
meaning of 'evidence favorable to an accused' as discussed in Brady." (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 87 (1963))); see also United States v. Price, 566 F-3 d 900, 913 n.14 (9 th Cir. 2009) ("For the
benefit of trial prosecutors who must regularly decide what material to turn over, we note favorably
the thoughtful analysis set forth [by the courts in Acosta and Sudikof] .. . .").
71. United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3 d 132, 140 (2d Cir. 2001); see also United States. v. Causey,
356 F. Supp. 2d 681, 696 (S.D. Tex. 2005) ("Because the Brady standard applied in Sudikoff conflicts
with the Brady standard applied in this circuit, and because defendants fail to cite-and the court has
not found-any case in which the Fifth Circuit has adopted or applied the Sudikoff standard, the court
is not persuaded to apply that standard in this case."). Additionally, "[t]here is no uniform approach in
the federal courts to the treatment of inadmissible evidence as the basis for Brady claims." Paradis v.
Arave, 24o F.3d I169, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 F-3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2003)
("The circuits are split on whether a petitioner can have a viable Brady claim if the withheld evidence
itself is inadmissible.").
72. Irwin H. Schwartz, Beyond Brady: Using Model Rule 3 .8(d) in Federal Court for Discovery of
Exculpatory Information, CHAMPION, Mar. 20o, at 34, 34-35.
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prosecution may decide that the information is merely cumulative or
need not be disclosed because there is overwhelming evidence of guilt.
Model Rule 3.8(d) and the standards and practices in numerous
state courts require disclosure of information favorable to the defense
regardless of materiality -that is, regardless of any anticipated impact of
the information on the potential verdict." The National District
Attorneys Association ("NDAA") adopts this position as well. The
NDAA developed standards that make clear that the materiality
standard for reversal on appeal should not be the standard for
production of pretrial information.74
On the other hand, the DOJ adheres to the materiality standard.
Despite this, the USAM indicates, "Recognizing that it is sometimes
difficult to assess the materiality of evidence before trial, prosecutors
generally must take a broad view of materiality and err on the side of
disclosing exculpatory and impeaching evidence.""
Proposed Standard 3-5.5(c) provides clarity. It requires the
prosecution to disclose information whether or not it meets the appellate
standard of materiality for reversal of a criminal conviction:
(c) Before trial of a criminal case, a prosecutor should make timely
disclosure to the defense of information described in (a) above that is
known to the prosecutor, regardless of whether the prosecutor believes it
is likely to change the result of the proceeding. Regarding discovery
prior to a guilty plea, see Standard 3-5.8 below. The obligations to
identify and disclose such information continue throughout the
prosecution of a criminal case.
This significant change is positive and likely to guide state prosecutors,
but federal prosecutors are likely to continue to adhere to the USAM
73. See ABA Op. 09-454, supra note 4, at 4 ("[T]he prosecutor's disclosure of evidence and
information favorable to the defense promotes the proper functioning of the adversarial process,
thereby reducing the risk of false convictions.").
74. NAT'L DIsT. ATrORNEYS Ass'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 15 (2oo9), available at
http://www.pretrial.org/Docs/Documents/NDAA%202010%2OStandards.pdf ("The prosecutor shall
make timely disclosure of exculpatory or mitigating evidence, as required by law and/or applicable
rules of ethical conduct.").
75. U.S. ArrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 54, at 9-5.oo(B)(1) ("Exculpatory and impeachment
evidence is material to a finding of guilt-and thus the Constitution requires disclosure-when there is
a reasonable probability that effective use of the evidence will result in an acquittal. Recognizing that
it is sometimes difficult to assess the materiality of evidence before trial, prosecutors generally must
take a broad view of materiality and err on the side of disclosing exculpatory and impeaching
evidence. While ordinarily, evidence that would not be admissible at trial need not be disclosed, this
policy encourages prosecutors to err on the side of disclosure if admissibility is a close question."
(citations omitted)). This guideline is undercut, however, by a preceding caution against over-
disclosure. See id. at 9-5.O(A) ("The policy, however, recognizes that other interests, such as witness
security and national security, are also critically important and that if disclosure prior to trial might
jeopardize these interests, disclosure may be delayed or restricted . . . ." (citation omitted)).
76. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5(c) (Proposed Revisions
2010) (emphasis added). There is no comparable provision in the current Standard. See STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION (3 d ed. 1993).
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when in conflict with the ABA Criminal Justice Standards until courts
decide otherwise.
C. TIMING
A third, but equally important, issue is the timing of disclosure.
Although most state and federal discovery rules include an obligation for
"timely" disclosure, the definition here varies as well. Prosecutors
disclose information at varying times." Many courts impose the standard
that prosecutors are required to disclose information in time to be useful
at trial.'" This may, however, permit disclosure on the eve of trial.79
The timing of disclosure may vary depending upon whether the
information is exculpatory or impeachment material. Decisional law
varies as to such obligations." Federal law and some state statutes and
77. Some prosecutors disclose favorable evidence right when they discover it. See, e.g., United
States v. Seijo, 514 F.2d 1357, 1363 (2d Cir. 1975) (noting that upon discovery of the FBI investigation
criminal identification sheet, the prosecutor "filed an affidavit with the court" reporting his finding);
United States v. Sheehan, 442 F. Supp. 1003, 1007 (D. Mass. 1977) ("The government's constitutional
obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant is a continuing one."); People v. Bennett,
349 N.Y.S.2d 506, 518 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) ("[The prosecutor] recognized the need for substantial
discovery, and acceded to the defendants' demands for the inspection of certain of the material sought
on the[] motions."). Other prosecutors respond to pretrial demands by the defense for exculpatory
material with less enthusiasm and provide responses stating that they are aware of and will comply
with their obligations under Brady. E.g., United States v. Deutsch, 373 F. Supp. 289, 290 (S.D.N.Y.
1974).
78. See People v. Arthur, 673 N.Y.S.2d 486, 504 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) ("Trial courts... have long
recognized that information which is clearly exculpatory should be disclosed at the earliest possible
opportunity in advance of trial, in order to permit the defense sufficient time to investigate it and
present it at trial."); see also People v. Jackson, 637 N.Y.S.2d 158, 161 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (requiring,
under Brady, disclosure of evidence favorable to the accused in advance of trial); People v. Hunter,
48o N.Y.S.2d 1oo6, oo9 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984) ("[O]bviously exculpatory evidence ought to be
disclosed to the defense even in the absence of a demand for it ... [and] ought to be disclosed at the
earliest possible opportunity."); People v. Bottom, 351 N.Y.S.2d 328, 334 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) ("[T]he
rationale behind requiring the disclosure of favorable evidence clearly indicates that it is not adequate
compliance with due process when information furnished the defense is either too little or too late for
the defendant to make the fullest use of it at the trial.").
79. In United States v. Coppa, a federal trial court during the intricate prosecution ordered
production of Brady material at the outset of the proceedings. 267 F-3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2oo). The
circuit court set aside the order and permitted the government to decide when disclosure was
appropriate. See id. at 144 ("[A]s long as a defendant possess Brady evidence in time for its effective
use, the government has not deprived the defendant of due process of law . . . ").
80. See Deutsch, 373 F. Supp. at 290 ("It should be obvious to anyone involved with criminal trials
that exculpatory information may come too late if it is given only at trial, and that the effective
implementation of Brady v. Maryland must therefore require earlier production in at least some
situations."); see also Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 523, 532 n.io (iith Cir. 1985) ("In some instances
[disclosure of Brady material the day before trial] may be sufficient. However... some [Brady]
material must be disclosed earlier. This is because of the importance of some information to adequate
trial preparation." (citations omitted)). For a case that disagrees, see United States ex rel. Lucas v.
Regan, 503 F.2d 1, 2-3 (2d Cir. 1974), where a prosecutor did not disclose to the defense until the
second day of trial that a witness had previously identified another person as the one who robbed her.
The court held that "[n]either Brady nor any other case we know of requires that disclosure under
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rules provide that witness statements that are not Brady material
generally need not be produced until after that witness testifies.' Many
defense lawyers and scholars believe that the most significant disclosure
issue in the federal criminal justice system is that witness statements are
not disclosed early in the process, thereby undermining a fair and
12effective criminal process. By contrast, federal prosecutors and some
state prosecutors adhere to the view that "premature disclosure of
witness statements increases the risk of witness intimidation and creates
opportunity for the opposing party to script the testimony of their
witnesses in response." Consequently, despite discretion to disclose,
prosecutors may strictly adhere to the statutory requirements and deny
early disclosure.
In state courts, some jurisdictions impose specific time limitations
within which to produce information. The focal point may be the
commencement of the trial: those jurisdictions require prosecutors to
complete whatever disclosure obligations they have seven, ten, or thirty
days prior to trial.8 Other states require disclosure within a certain time
frame after the defense has made its requests, usually within thirty days
or fewer.8' Still others use the filing of charges or arraignment as a
marker, and still others require discovery only after the defendant has
entered a plea of "not guilty."" Finally, the remaining states provide
looser standards such as "as soon as reasonably possible."87
Brady must be made before trial." Id. at 3 n.I.
81. See Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 35oo(a) (2oo6). The USAM requires exculpatory evidence to be
disclosed "reasonably promptly after it is discovered," while impeachment information about
government witnesses need only be disclosed "at a reasonable time before trial." U.S. ArrORNEYS'
MANUAL, supra note 54, at 9-5.00(D)(I)--(2). Delayed disclosure requires supervisory approval. Id. at
9-5.oi(D)(4). But see N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. § 240-45(I) (McKinney, Westlaw through 2010 legislation)
(requiring the state to turn over witnesses' statements to the defense after the jury has been sworn and
prior to opening statements).
82. See Edward A. Mallett, Discovery, CHAMPION, June 2001, at 7, 7 ("We begin with one
common sense improvement: There should be a pre-trial disclosure of all witnesses statements and
witness agreements."). See generally Cynthia Hujar Orr, I Hate to Tell You This, CHAMPION, Mar. 2010,
at 5.
83. Letter from Paul J. McNulty, supra note 59, at 9.
84. SCHOEFFEL, supra note 18, at 143, 145; see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1054.1 (a), (f) (West
2010).
85. E.g., COLO. R. CRIM. P. 16 II(b)(i), 11(c) (requiring disclosure as soon as practicable but no
later than twenty days after defendant's first appearance, and adding that in no case may disclosure
occur less than thirty days before trial for a felony or seven days for a nonfelony, except for good
cause); FLA. R. CRIm. P. 3.220(a) (requiring disclosure within fifteen days of defense's "notice of
discovery").
86. E.g., Aiuz. R CRIM. P 15.1 (c) (thirty days after arraignment); MAss. R CRIM. P 14 (a)(I)(A)
(at a pretrial conference); N.J. Cr. R. 3:13-3 (c)(16) (within fourteen days of an indictment).
87. MicH. Or. R. 6.201(F) ("Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the prosecuting attorney must
comply with the requirements of this rule within 21 days of a request under this rule and a defendant
must comply with the requirements of this rule within 21 days of a request under this rule.");
SCHOEFFEL, supra note 18, at 149 ("In Illinois, the prosecution must disclose 'any material or
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Rather than choose a specific time frame, Model Rule 3.8(d) and
the current edition of the ABA Criminal Justice Standards require timely
disclosure. That is, "it must be made early enough that the information
can be used effectively." This "appears to mandate that prosecutors
disclose exculpatory material during plea negotiations, if not sooner."8
Despite the ethics rules and varying state statutes and court rules that
may imply that the information must be made available prior to the entry
of a guilty plea, this is not necessarily the practice. This issue looms large
in criminal practice, because more than ninety-five percent of cases result
in guilty pleas.' Consequently, producing information that mitigates the
offense or punishment is key to the fair and effective administration of
justice.
Until the Supreme Court's 2002 decision in United States v. Ruiz,
there was a trend in federal and state courts toward requiring prosecutors
to disclose Brady material prior to a guilty plea.9' In Ruiz, the Court held
that defendants who plead guilty have no pre-plea right to Brady
information relevant to either impeachment or an affirmative defense.9
The Court did not address the right to exculpatory evidence, and there is
no clear federal authority as to whether the prosecution must disclose
material exculpatory evidence before a guilty plea is entered.'
information within its possession or control which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the
offense charged or which would tend to reduce his punishment .... as soon as practicable following
the filing of a motion by defense counsel."' (quoting ILL. S. Cr. R. 412(c), (d))).
88. See ABA Op. 09-454, supra note 4, at 6.
89. PETER A. Joy & KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL, Do No WRONG: ETHICS FOR PROSECUTORS AND
DEFENDERS 145 (2009).
90. Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice,
154 U. PA. L. REV. 79,90 (2o05).
91. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ethics and Plea Bargaining: What's Discovery Got to Do with It?, Cam.
JusT., Fall 2oo8, at 28, 31.
92. See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629-33 (2002) (holding there was no Brady violation
where the government required the defendant to waive access to impeachment evidence prior to
entering into a plea agreement).
93. Compare Orman v. Cain, 228 F-3d 616, 62o-21 (5th Cir. 2ooo) (holding that, absent a clear
rule by the Supreme Court, state courts may decline to extend the Brady obligation to guilty pleas,
because the rule is intended to protect integrity of trials), with Ferrara v. United States, 456 F-3 d 278,
293 (ist Cir. 2oo6) (holding that it was a Brady violation where government failed to disclose an
integral prosecution witness's recantation before the suspect entered a plea), McCann v. Mangialardi,
337 F-3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that the voluntariness of guilty plea can be challenged on
Brady grounds if government withholds evidence of factual innocence), United States v. Avellino,
136 F.3 d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea is subject to
challenge if a Brady violation occurs, because the government's obligation to disclose Brady material
is pertinent to the determination of whether or not to plead guilty), United States v. Nagra, 147 F-3d
875, 881-82 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding no Brady violation despite the government's nondisclosure of false
statements made by government agents to defendant before pleading guilty, because there was no
proof that "but for" this information defendant would have gone to trial), United States v. Wright, 43
F-3 d 491, 496 (ioth Cir. 1994) (holding that under limited circumstances, a Brady violation can render
defendant's guilty plea involuntary), and White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 422 (8th Cir. 1988)
(holding that voluntariness of a guilty plea can be challenged on Brady grounds).
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Nevertheless, Ruiz swiftly dampened the trend in state and federal
courts for mandated pretrial disclosure of information favorable to the
accused in the pre-guilty plea stage of the criminal justice process.' A
few states specify that disclosure must be made prior to the entry of a
guilty plea.'
Proponents for codifying standards and federal rules to require such
production believe that, as a result of the promulgation of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines and the importance of even minor facts
that can affect punishment by diminishing the degree of a defendant's
culpability or offense level, the timely production of Brady information
in the sentencing context is critical. On the other hand, some prosecutors
articulate the view that such a requirement is administratively
burdensome and would defeat many of the reasons for offering a plea
bargain. Cases involving voluminous documents raise such concerns, as
do cases involving the protection of the identity of witnesses or
informants. This is primarily a concern of federal prosecutors whose
cases are often the product of lengthy investigations, voluminous
documents, and other information obtained by numerous agencies and
international investigations.
Prosecutors also express the concern that early revelation of
impeachment-as opposed to exculpatory-evidence would undermine
the ability to obtain a guilty plea or guilty verdict at trial by providing the
defense with additional information to undermine a witness's credibility.
Other prosecutors disagree that the impact of early disclosure of
impeachment information has such a significant impact.' Defense
lawyers argue that disclosure of impeachment evidence is as significant
as, and often constitutes, exculpatory information. Consequently, there
should be no distinction in the timing of the disclosure obligation.
Proposed Standard 3-5.5 requires the prosecution to identify
promptly the requisite information and to advise promptly the agencies
involved in the case about their duties.'" It then requires the prosecution
to make timely disclosure to the defense of the requisite information."
94. Peter A. Joy & Kevin C, McMunigal, Prosecutorial Disclosure of Exculpatory Information in
the Guilty Plea Context: Current Law, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2007, at 50.
95. See, e.g., N.J. RULES OF Cr. R. 3:13-3(a).
96. TARUN ET AL., supra note 58, at io- i.
97. It was notable that federal prosecutors in some U.S. Attorneys' offices disagreed with the
views expressed by the DOJ during roundtable discussions.
98. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCrlON § 3 -5.5(b) (Proposed Revisions
20ro).
99. Id. § 3-5-5(c) ("Before trial of a criminal case, a prosecutor should make timely disclosure to
the defense of information described in (a) above that is known to the prosecutor, regardless of
whether the prosecutor believes it is likely to change the result of the proceeding. Regarding discovery
prior to a guilty plea, see Standard 3-5.8 below. The obligations to identify and disclose such
information continue throughout the prosecution of a criminal case.").
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The only reference in 3-5.5 to the timing of disclosure prior to the entry
of a guilty plea is a referral to proposed Standard 3-5.8.'" Nevertheless,
proposed Standard 3-5.8 makes no mention of any disclosure obligations.
Instead, proposed Standard 3-5.7(e) states: "Prior to entering into a plea
agreement, the prosecutor should disclose to the defense . .. information
currently known to the prosecutor that tends to negate guilt, mitigates
the offense or is likely to reduce punishment."o'
The disclosure standard in 3-5.7 is similar to the one in 3-5.5(a).
However, there are a few notable differences. First, while 3.5-5(a)
requires disclosure of information known to the prosecution or its agents,
3-5.7 requires only disclosure of information known to the prosecutor.
This may assuage the fears of those who believe a broader standard
would burden them with collecting information from a wide range of
agencies that are not involved in the case.o2 Second, unlike 3-5.5(a), 3-5.7
does not explicitly require the disclosure of information that tends to
impeach the government's witnesses or evidence. This leaves unresolved
the debate over whether impeachment evidence should be revealed prior
to entry of a guilty plea. It is, of course, possible to imply that the
Standard imposes such an obligation, but such an implication is not a
substitute for clarity. Nevertheless, it is significant that the Standards
acknowledge that disclosure of information as specified by 3-5.7(e) must
be made prior to the entry of a guilty plea. How many days or weeks
prior to the decision to plead guilty is left unclear.
ioo. Id. § 3-5.8. That Standard, entitled "Establishing and Fulfilling Conditions of Negotiated
Dispositions," provides:
(a) A prosecutor should not demand terms in a negotiated disposition (such as a plea
agreement or deferred prosecution or diversion agreement) that are unlawful or in violation
of public policy. The prosecutor should ensure that all promises and conditions that are part
of the agreement are memorialized.
(b) The prosecutor may properly promise the defense that the prosecutor will or will not
take a particular position concerning sentence and conditions. However, the prosecutor
should not imply a greater power to influence the disposition of a case than is actually
possessed.
(c) Once an agreement is final and accepted by the court, the prosecutor should comply
with, and make good faith efforts to have carried out, the government's obligations in the
agreement. The prosecutor should construe agreement conditions and evaluate performance,
including any cooperation, in a good-faith and reasonable manner.
(d) If the prosecutor believes that a defendant has breached an agreement accepted by
the court, the prosecutor should notify the defense regarding the prosecutor's belief and any
intended adverse action. If the defense presents a good-faith disagreement and the parties
cannot quickly resolve it, the prosecutor ordinarily should not act before judicial resolution.
(e) If the prosecutor reasonably believes that the court is acting inconsistently with any
term of a plea agreement, the prosecutor should raise the matter with the court.
Id.
ios. Id. § 3-5.7(e).
102. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
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In general, precise time periods for disclosure are inadvisable for the
Standards. A myriad of factors prevent the adoption of uniform national
standards on the precise timing of disclosure: differences between federal
and state practice, policy differences between and among state and local
jurisdictions, and the overall difficulty of ensuring agreement on
particularized time provisions. It would, however, be significant to adopt
a standard that specifies that the information must be produced in time
to be used effectively in considering whether or not to enter a plea of
guilty.
Proposed Standard 3-5.5(b) includes additional modifications that
clarify legal and ethical obligations and provide a benchmark for best
practices. Proposed Standard 3-5.5(b) requires that the prosecution
"advise other governmental agencies involved in the case of their
continuing duty to identify, preserve and disclose."" The current
Standard does not have a provision for such notification. This is a useful
and important change. Some have suggested that the notification be
broadened to include agencies that have information about the case,
even though they are not directly involved in the investigation or
prosecution. For example, in a case alleging an international terrorism
conspiracy, agencies beyond those specifically involved in the case, such
as the Immigration and Customs Enforcement, may have information
that is important and should be preserved and, in some cases, disclosed
to the defense. Mechanisms need to be established to ensure that
agencies are on notice of the existence of such interrelated cases. This
raises fundamental issues about the need to establish data collection,
preservation, and sharing mechanisms and procedures across state and
federal jurisdictions."
Proposed Standard 3.5-5(d) also provides a useful modification,
because it clarifies the need for specificity in response to a discovery
request. It provides:
(d) A prosecutor should promptly respond to, and make a diligent
effort to comply with, legally proper discovery requests. The
prosecutor should ordinarily provide specific responses to individualized
defense requests for specific information, not just an acknowledgement
of the prosecutor's general discovery obligations."os
There is no comparable provision in the current Standard. Current
Standard 3-3.1(b) provides that the prosecutor should make a
103. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE. PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5(b) (Proposed Revisions
2oo) (emphasis added).
104. See, e.g., Yaroshefsky, supra note 2, at 1944; New Perspectives on Brady, supra note 19, at
1972-79 (report by Keith A. Findley, Clinical Professor of Law, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch.).
105. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5 .5 (d) (Proposed Revisions
2oo) (emphasis added).
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"reasonably diligent effort" to comply with a legally proper discovery
request."
D. VOLUMINOUS MATERIAL
Proposed Standard 3-5.5(f) provides:
(f) A prosecutor should not avoid pursuit of information or evidence
because the prosecutor believes it will damage the prosecution's case
or aid the accused. A prosecutor should not intentionally attempt to
obscure information identified pursuant to (a) above by disclosing it as
part of a large volume of materials."
There is no comparable provision in the prior set of Standards.
An increasing number of cases involve voluminous discovery."o The
production burdens for the government can be significant.'" In such
cases, large production can obscure the critical evidence essential to
effective preparation of the defense."o The Standards implicitly
acknowledge a principle of fundamental fairness in ensuring that there
are no "document dumps" or other attempts to obscure information.
III. PROPOSED STANDARDS ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCLOSURE:
THE OMISSIONS MEMORALIZING WITNESS STATEMENTS
The proposed Standards make significant modifications. However,
issues that are not addressed will require ongoing debate, discussion, and
written best practices and standards. One recurring issue is whether the
prosecution should be required to memorialize witness statements.
Scholars, judges, and lawyers have long commented that prior
inconsistent statements of witnesses often are not produced to the
defense because these are not in writing."' In some jurisdictions, it is
acknowledged that prosecutors are trained, either formally or informally,
not to put statements in writing."' In such jurisdictions, the lawyers
io6. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.1I(b) (3d ed. 1993).
107. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3- 5.5 (f) (Proposed Revisions
2010).
1o8. See Joel E. Cohen & Danielle Alfonzo Walsman, The 'Brady Dump': Problems with 'Open
File' Discovery, N.Y. L.J. (Sept. 4,2009), http://www.stroock.com/SiteFiles/Pub829.pdf.
to9. See id.
Ito. See id.
III. R. Michael Cassidy, Character and Context: What Virtue Theory Can Teach Us About a
Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to "Seek Justice", 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 635, n.174 (2oo6) (explaining that
many prosecutors discourage investigative agents from taking witness statements); Bennett L.
Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland. Games Prosecutors Play, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 540
(2o07); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling and
Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917,961 (1999).
112. See Michael A. Simons, Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement,
56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 49 n.220 (2oo3) ("Most prosecutors routinely make every effort to minimize the
creation of such statements. Even if the mediation were conducted in a way that did not create any
written record, oral statements made by the cooperator-particularly those in which the cooperator
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acknowledge, but may forget, that Brady material must be produced
whether it is written or not." "[U]nless prosecutors require agents to
take detailed notes, prosecutors may fail to recall inconsistent statements
given to the prosecutor at different points in time and may be entirely
unaware of inconsistent statements given to the agents outside the
prosecutor's presence."" 4 The DOJ requires that "[m]aterial variances in
a witness's statements should be memorialized, even if they are within
the same interview, and they should be provided to the defense as Giglio
information.""
Wrongful convictions cases have demonstrated the need to utilize
audio and videotapes for identification procedures, confessions, and
witness statements."' Prosecutors' offices around the country have
considered methods to reduce the likelihood of wrongful convictions."
One of the suggestions that needs careful consideration is whether or not
to require tape recording-or at least memorializing- the statements of
witnesses and potential witnesses, including cooperating defendants."'
The Standards should not remain silent on this recurring issue.
admitted his own wrongdoing-could still be discoverable as exculpatory impeachment evidence."
(citation omitted)); see also John G. Douglass, Confronting the Reluctant Accomplice, 1ol COLUM. L.
REV. 1797, 1863 (2ooi) ("Prosecutors are trained to avoid creating Jencks material." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
113. United States v. Rodriguez, 496 F-3d 221, 222 (2d Cir. 2007) ("When the Government is in
possession of material information that impeaches its witness or exculpates the defendant, it does not
avoid the obligation under BradylGiglio to disclose the information by not writing it down."); Sara
Gurwitch, When Self-Policing Does Not Work: A Proposal for Policing Prosecutors in Their Obligation
to Provide Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 303, 316 (2oo) ("If, for
example, in the context of exculpatory evidence that has not been reduced to writing, a witness
provided information, via an oral account, that cast doubt on the defendant's guilt, the witness's
statement would be Brady material."); Simons, supra note I12, at 47 n.220.
114. Bruce A. Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their Disclosure Obligations: Can
Prosecutors' Offices Learn from Their Mistakes?, 31 CARDOzo L. REV. 2161, 2168 n.37 (2010).
115. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, supra note 64.
It6. See Eyewitness Identification, THE INNOCENCE PROJEcr, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/
Eyewitness-Identification.php (last visited May 23, 2011) ("Identification procedures should be
videotaped whenever possible-this protects innocent suspects from any misconduct by the lineup
administrator, and it helps the prosecution by showing a jury that the procedure was legitimate.");
False Confessions & Mandatory Recording of Interrogations, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/fLix/False-Confessions.php (last visited May 23, 201I) (outlining the
benefits of recording interrogations and confessions).
117. See, e.g., Conviction Integrity Unit, DALLAS CNTY. DIST. ATrORNEY's OFFICE,
http://www.dallasda.com/conviction-integrity.html (last visited May 23, 2011); Conviction Integrity
Program, N.Y. CNTY. DIsT. ArrORNEY'S OFFICE, http://www.manhattanda.org/organizationlintegrity/
(last visited May 23, 2011); see also Voices from the Field, supra note 4o, at 2074-77 (presentation of
John Chisholm, Dist. Attorney, Milwaukee Cnty.) (discussing how individuals are processed through
the criminal justice system).
118. See Editorial, True and Untrue Confessions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2008, at A14; see also
INNOCENCE PROJEcr, LESSONS NOT LEARNED: NEW YORK STATE LEADS IN THE NUMBER OF WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS BUT LAGS IN Poucy REFORMS THAT CAN PREVENT THEM 28-29 (2oo7) (supporting
generally the practice of recording interrogations and witness interviews); NORTHAMFFON POLICE DEP'T,
ADMINISTRATION & OPERATIONS MANUAL ch. 0-4o8, at 8-9; Memorandum from the State of N.J. Dep't
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Even if not required by law, best practices should dictate that
prosecutors or their agents memorialize the details of all witness
statements. Many prosecutors currently engage in such practices."'
Prosecutors disagree, sometimes even in the same office, as to the
potential effect of such a practice on their cases. Some prosecutors
believe that providing additional statements to the defense will
undermine the ability to achieve a just result and that defense attorneys
will take undue advantage of prior inconsistencies. Others believe that
this concern is quite overstated. On balance, the fair practice is to
memorialize such statements. It would certainly reduce risk of error of
wrongful convictions. 20
A. WRITTEN DISCLOSURE, CERTIFICATION, COURT CONFERENCES, AND
CHECKLISTS
The proposed Standards do not include provisions requiring the
prosecution to make written disclosure of the discovery in sufficient
detail to permit the defense to investigate the information. Nor do they
require the prosecution to certify to the trial court that it has exercised
due diligence in locating and attempting to locate all requisite
information and has provided what is required to the defendant. Such
procedures were recommended by the ACTL in their 2003 proposal to
amend the Federal Rules."' A number of jurisdictions have adopted such
provisions."' The rationale is that such a requirement encourages due
diligence in the production of information."' Any lawyer is likely to
exercise greater care when required to certify that he has done so to a
court.
At the very least, the Standards should reflect the ABA resolution
that all jurisdictions adopt procedures that at a "reasonable time prior to
[a criminal] trial," the court conduct a conference to ensure that the
parties are "fully aware of the their respective disclosure obligations
of Law & Public Safety to All County Prosecutors, at § II.E (Apr. i8, 2001), available at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/NJ-eyewitness.pdf; Line-up Protocol for Law Enforcement,
POLICE CHIEFS' Ass'N OF SANTA CLARA CNTY., http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/eyewitness/
expert/Santa%2oClara%2oCounty%2oEyewitness%2oldentification%2oProtocols.pdf (last visited
May 23, 2011) ("Record both positive identification and non-identification results in writing, including
the witness' own words regarding how sure he/she is.").
II9. New Perspectives on Brady, supra note 19, at 1981-82 (report by Keith A. Findley, Clinical
Professor of Law, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch.).
120. See Voices from the Field, supra note 40, at 2052-56 (presentation of Dr. Gordon Schiff,
Assoc. Dir., Ctr. for Patient Safety Research & Practice, Brigham & Women's Hospital) (discussing
lessons from diagnosis errors and disclosure in medicine).
121. TARUN ET AL., supra note 58, at 23-24.
122. See New Perspectives on Brady, supra note 19, at 1979-80 (report by Keith A. Findley,
Clinical Professor of Law, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch.); see also MAsS. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(3).
123. New Perspectives on Brady, supra note 19, at 1979-80 (report by Keith A. Findley, Clinical
Professor of Law, Univ. of Wis. Law Sch.).
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under applicable discovery rules, statutes, ethical standards and the
federal and state constitutions and to offer the court's assistance in
resolving disputes over disclosure obligations.""
Part and parcel of the court conference is a suggested checklist
system whereby the trial court disseminates to the prosecution and the
defense a detailed checklist of the disclosure obligations under Brady
and its progeny and applicable ethical standards.'
B. E-DISCOVERY
The proposed Standards do not address a critical aspect of
discovery: Should there be specific Standards for electronically stored
information akin to civil discovery rules? If so, should the rules require
the prosecution to specifically identify exculpatory, impeachment, and
other discoverable information?
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) was amended to address
electronic discovery.", As a result, a system exists in the civil context
where parties convene, discuss, and work together in the production of
electronically stored information ("ESI") in civil cases."' In the criminal
context, however, no parallel system exists.
Criminal e-discovery is rapidly evolving, especially in the areas of
subpoena compliance, search warrants, and post-indictment discovery.12
Electronic discovery in the criminal context can present a number of
challenges. Servers and hard drives can contain hundreds of gigabytes,
even a few terabytes, of ESI."' Defendants can incur high costs in time
and expense in obtaining and reviewing the materials. 30 Criminal
subpoenas can request ESI, and it is critical that defendants adequately
respond: failure to comply can result in a wide range of consequences,
124. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF
DELEGATES 102D, at 5 (20o).
125. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES Io4A, at 4 (2011);
cf Voices from the Field, supra note 4o, at 2046 (presentation of Dr. Gordon Schiff, Assoc. Dir., Ctr.
for Patient Safety Research & Practice, Brigham & Women's Hospital) (explaining how checklists can
reduce medical error rates).
126. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). Rule 26(f) expands the list of issues that must be discussed as a part of
the meet and confer process and includes a requirement that parties develop a discovery plan that
addresses issues relating to discovery of ESI, including the form or forms in which it will be produced.
Id. It also requires parties to discuss any issues relating to the preservation of discoverable information
and to address issues relating to claims of privilege or work product protection. Id.
127. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f); Justin P. Murphy & Stephen M. Byers, E-Discovery in the Criminal
Context: Considerations for Company Counsel, 9 Digital Discovery & e-Evidence Rep. (BNA) No. io,
at I (Oct. 1, 2009).
128. Murphy & Byers, supra note 127.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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from a motion to compel compliance to charges of obstruction of
justice. 3 '
Perhaps such an intricate area is better left to the Federal Rules
committees, legislation, or case law, but it is incumbent upon the criminal
justice system at least to promote the development of systems, protocols,
and practices for data collection, gathering, and dissemination that is
somewhat akin to the manner in which the civil litigation system has
undertaken the task. The Standards should acknowledge the need for the
development of such systems.
CONCLUSION
The ABA's proposed Standards make important modifications that
provide a uniform approach to defining the prosecutors' disclosure
duties. These modifications clarify key issues that are repeatedly the
subject of confusion, disagreement, and doctrinal difference across state
and federal jurisdictions. It is commendable that the ABA Criminal
Justice Standards waded into these waters and suggest what, at the very
least, are best practices.
Many question the extent to which prosecutors look beyond their
own interpretation of legal obligations and the local practices in their
offices to ethics rules or standards as the actual guideposts for disclosure
practices. One can only be optimistic that the continuing discussion
about the role of ethics rules and ABA Criminal Justice Standards will
have a developing impact on the implementation of discovery practices.
These Standards "beyond the law" are of particular significance in a
climate where increased attention is paid to remedying the causes of
wrongful convictions. Some prosecutors' offices are broadening their
disclosure practices for a host of reasons, including the reduction of
potential wrongful convictions.
The roundtable discussions that occurred at law schools throughout
the country provided a unique opportunity for many judges, prosecutors,
defense lawyers, and academics to gather and consider whether and to
what extent these Standards are useful or necessary and what role they
should assume in the criminal justice process. These discussions were the
beginning of a careful assessment of the interplay between constitutional
and statutory law, courts rules, ethics rules, and standards for good
practice. One hopes that the discussions continue, that prosecutors' and
defense lawyers' organizations utilize the ABA Criminal Justice
Standards in training their lawyers, and that courts continue to rely on
the Standards in their opinions. These Standards are deserving of critical
attention.
131. Id.
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